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RECENT DECISIONS
wife's name was presumably for her benefit 5 and survivorship attaches.
In 1914, the Banking Law was amended so as to provide that a
deposit made by a person in the name of himself and another and in
form payable to either or the survivor, and all accretions thereto, shall
become the joint property of both parties, payable to either during the
lifetime of both, or to the survivor of them.6 This statutory provision,
however, does not derogate from the value of Surrogate Slater's able
review and discussion of bank deposit cases.
BILLS AND NOTES-LIABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED AGENT UNDER
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw.-Plaintiff sued on a promissory note
signed "J. & G. Lippmann, L. J. Lippmann, Pres.," alleging in its com-
plaint that the corporate defendant denied the authority of the individual
defendant to execute the note as its president, and demanding judgment
against the corporate defendant, or in the alternative, against the indi-
vidual defendant, in the manner authorized by the Practice Act.1 The
individual defendant attacked the complaint upon the ground that,
granting he signed the note on behalf of the corporation without
authority, he could not be held liable upon the note but only for breach
of warranty of authority, and that, therefore, the complaint, predicated
upon the note itself, stated no cause of action against him. Held,
individual defendant liable upon the note, one justice dissenting (ap-
parently on the ground that Negotiable Instruments Law §392 admits
of no negative implication). New Georgia National Bank v. J. & G.
Lippmann, a New York Corporation, impleaded with L. J. Lippmann,
Individually, 222 App. Div. 383 (1st Dept. 192R).
The rule enunciated in the prevailing opinion that an agent who.
without authority, executes a negotiable instrument in the name of his
principal is himself liable on the instrument finds general approbation
among courts and text writers. 3 This rule, however, was not followed
5Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911 (1923).
ON. Y. Banking L., 1914, Sec. 198.
1 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. § 213.
2 "Liability of person signing as agent. Where the instrument contains or
a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf
of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instru-
ment, if he was duly authorized." (Uniform N. I. L. § 20).
3 2Williston, Contracts § 1144. "The words 'if he was duly authorized' seem
to carry the imlication that if unauthorized the agent is not merely liable for
breach of a norA-negotiable warranty, but liable on the instrument itself."
Brannan's Neg. Inst. Law (4th Ed.) p. 163. Professor Ames, "Under this
section, an agent signing without authority of the principal is, by implication,
liable on the instrument."
Judge Brewster, one of the commissioners who drafted the N. I. L. writes:
"There is no injustice. The agent should know whether he has authority.
He should be liable as the maker of the note. Such is the rule of the
German Code."
Accord, Professor McKeehan and Professor Chafee, the editor of the
fourth edition of Brannan's Neg. Inst. Law.
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in New York prior to the enactment of the N. I. L.. nor is it the rule
in England. The rule that existed in this state, and that exists in
England, was that a person signing for, or on behalf of, a principal was
not liable on the instrument, notwithstanding he had no authority to
bind his principal. There was an implied warranty on his part that he
possessed the requisite authority, and if he did not. he became liable
upon such warranty for the .lamages resulting from the breach.
4
It is submitted that the rule as stated in the affirming opinion is
the sounder, inasmuch as the agent when he signs without authority is
in reality not an agent but a principal acting in his own behalf, deriving
the benefits of his act, and should, therefore, be primarily liable on the
instrument itself and not incidentally on a warranty of authority.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE-STATUTE
OF LiMITATIONS.-In an action brought in a superior court of Wash-
ington, a judgment was -rendered against McDonald on June 24, 1918,
in favor of Dart. In February, 1924, Dart assigned this judgment to
Roche. In March, McDonald being then temporarily employed in
Oregon, Roche brought suit against him upon the judgment in a circuit
court of that State. He was personally served with a summons.
appeared and demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled
and subsequently, in October, 1924, more than six years after the
rendition of the Washington judgment, judgment was rendered against
him in default of answer for the amount of the original judgment with
interest.
Shortly thereafter Roche brought this suit against McDonald, upon
the Oregon judgment, in the superior court of Washington. McDonald
answered denying the validity of the Oregon judgment under a Wash-
ington statute which provided that after six years from the rendition
of any judgment it should cease to be a charge against the judgment
debtor, and no suit should be had extending its duration or continuing
it in force beyond such six years.1 In reply Roche set up and relied
on the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.2 The superior
court entered judgment for defendant and this was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Washington.' Held, judgment reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings. Roche v. McDonald. 48 Sup. C. 142
(U. S. 1928).
It is settled that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
requires that the judgment of a State Court having jurisdiction of the
Ryan v. Hebert, 46 R. I. 47; 124 Ati. 657 (1924); Pain v. Holtcamp, 10
Fed. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Austin Nichols & Co. v. Gross. 98 Conn.
782, 120 Atl. 596 (1923).
4 Haupt v. Vint, 68 W. Va. 657 (1911) ; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117
(1862); Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70 (1802) ; White v. Skinner, 13
Johns. 307 (1816); Feeter v. Heath, 11 Wendell, 477 (1833) ; Collen v. Wright-
40 Eng. L. & Eq. 182.
1 Rem. Comp. Stat. Wash. §§ 459, 460.
2 U. S. Const. Art. 4 § 1.
3 136 Wash. 322, 239 Pac. 1015, 44 A. L. R. 444 (1925).
